We find evidence that executives use private information in exercising stock options. The most informed executives tend to exercise early, exercise after the vest date rather than at the vest date, do not exercise in anticipation of dividends, exercise a high percentage of their options, sell a large proportion of acquired stock, and exercise and leave the firm. The most costly options to exercise are associated with the most private information, and the least costly are associated with the least private information. We also find that higher ranked executives show greater exploitation of private information than do lower ranked executives. 
Private Information and the Exercise of Executive Stock Options
The use of private information by executives in executing stock transactions has been an important and controversial issue to academics, practitioners, and especially regulators. But stock transactions are not the only manner in which executives can exploit private information. The extensive use of stock options as compensation and incentives provides executives with another means of exploiting private information. This paper examines a large sample of exercises of executive stock options over a ten-year period to determine if these exercises show evidence of the use of private information.
Exercise of an option starts with the purchase of the stock at the exercise price, which can initially be viewed as an insider purchase. If the stock is sold, however, the transaction is clearly an insider sale.
Evidence reported elsewhere and confirmed in this study shows that most stock acquired upon exercise is sold. Hence, option exercises are analogous to insider stock sales. Thus, it is reasonable to question whether executives avoid loss of value by exercising their options using private information.
Empirical research shows that executive stock options are commonly exercised early. In addition to the use of private information, there are other reasons for early exercise. Given the lack of liquidity, exercise substitutes for selling the option. Because there are many reasons for selling an option unrelated to private information, a study of the use of private information must separate those exercises that could be motivated by private information from those that would not.
The primary hypothesis of this study is that executives exercise options prior to periods of significant negative abnormal stock performance. We develop several plausible hypotheses and separate exercises that are likely to be based on private information from those that should not. Our tests are conducted on a large data set of insider option exercises reported to the SEC between 1996 and 2005. For some of the tests we use the full sample of all exercises with available stock return data and for others we use a sub-sample of exercises that have the necessary supplemental data available from ExecuComp. We find strong evidence supporting the private information hypothesis. Exercises that should be motivated by private information are associated with post-exercise stock price performance that is significantly lower than that for exercises that should not be associated with private information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the relevant literature. In Section II, we discuss our data, hypothesis development, and methodology. Section III reports the empirical findings. Section IV discusses several extensions, and Section V presents our conclusions.
I. Previous Research
There is an extensive literature that addresses the costs of owner-manger conflicts. This diverse body of research ranges from the arguably seminal theory of agency costs of Jensen and Meckling (1976) to empirical work such as Yermack's (2006a) estimates of the cost to shareholders when executives use company aircraft for personal reasons. Insider trading, while developed in a separate thread of literature, is nonetheless an important component in understanding how the objectives of management clash with those of the shareholders.
Indeed insider trading is one the most widely-examined topics in finance research. Seyhun (1998) provides an excellent summary of the research on insider trading, which includes Jaffe (1974) , Finnerty (1974) , Rozeff and Zaman (1988) , Lin and Howe (1990) , Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003) , and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) . The findings suggest that inside information has value in earning abnormal returns after transaction costs, with most of the information contained in insider purchases.
There is some evidence that the value of inside information is greater in small firms than in large firms and that insider trading is more profitable for top executives than for other insiders. Insider trades are also more informative when they involve a larger number of shares.
Although there is a large body of literature devoted to insider trading in general, there have been few studies of insider trading in the form of executive or employee stock option exercises. To understand this line of research, we must first note that prior to May 1991, insiders were required to hold shares acquired upon exercise for at least six months. After May 1991 insiders could dispose of acquired shares immediately provided that the options had been held for at least six months. Hence, prior to May 1991 insiders would not necessarily exercise their options when they had strong reason to believe that the stock would perform poorly in the short-run. If they were in possession of such information after May 1991, they would likely be far more inclined to exercise, given that they could usually sell the stock right away.
Thus, it is in the post-1991 period that we concentrate our focus.
The frequent occurrence of early exercise is well-documented in the literature. The early exercise behavior of executives is studied by Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin (1996) and Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005) . Non-executive employees also exercise options early as found in Huddart and Lang (1996) .
A. Private Information as a Motivating Factor in Early Exercise
Seyhun (1998) examines insider option exercises in the post-1991 period and finds that the shares underperform the market by 0.8% following exercises. Carpenter and Remmers (2001) examine periods prior to and after May 1991 and find that exercises precede positive abnormal performance prior to May 1991. Following May 1991, however, they find no significant abnormal returns for their broad sample, but do find some evidence that top executives at small firms exploit their private information in exercising their options. In a study of exercises in the United Kingdom over 1995 -1998 , Kyriacou and Mase (2003 find some evidence that these options are exercised based on private information. Significant negative abnormal returns occur following exercises in which a relatively high proportion of acquired stock is sold. Core and Guay (2001) and Huddart and Lang (1996) find no evidence to support the notion that lowerlevel employees exercise based on private information. In a later study, however, Huddart and Lang (2003) do find such evidence. Cicero (2007) examines the interaction of exercising on private information and backdating of exercises and finds that when the shares are sold immediately, there is evidence of the use of private information. When the shares are not disposed of immediately, he finds evidence of both timing and the backdating of the exercise date, though the incidence of backdating was reduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Cai (2007) finds similar evidence and concludes that five to twelve percent of exercises involve manipulation of dates or exercise prices.
Another thread of research has examined the relationship between option exercises by insiders and the flexibility afforded by accounting rules. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) , Bartov and Mohanram (2004) , Wei (2004) , and Safdar (2004) all find evidence that exercises are commonly associated with earnings manipulation, often in the form of discretionary accruals. Safdar, however, concludes that the degree to which earnings are manipulated appears to be somewhat small.
Clearly there are several explanations other than private information for the early exercise of these options. To identify exercises that could have been motivated by private information, it is necessary that we identify those that are motivated by other reasons. In the following sub-sections, we discuss the various justifications given for the early exercise of executive stock options.
B. Factors Motivating Exercise Unrelated to Private Information
Because executives are so heavily compensated with stock and options, their portfolios are typically poorly diversified. Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) propose that exercising options, followed by sale of the stock, is a reasonable strategy to achieve greater diversification, and this idea is supported by the empirical work of Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin (1996) . Of course, exercise by itself does not eliminate exposure but Ofek and Yermack (2000) find that managers typically sell nearly all shares of stock acquired through the exercise of their options immediately. They also find that grants are correlated with vesting so if the options are not exercised upon vesting, the executive not only retains the vested options but acquires more options, which makes him even less diversified. Thus, there is a strong incentive to exercise options at the vest date.
Although insiders holding ESOs cannot sell or transfer their options, they could exercise early for liquidity purposes. For example, the executive could be planning to pay tuition or purchase an expensive automobile or house.
1 But if any of these scenarios apply, we should expect that a small portion of the vested options would be exercised. In other words, exercises motivated by information are likely to involve exercise of the largest number of options, if not all of them. Exercise motivated by liquidity is likely to require only the exercise of a smaller fraction of eligible options. Cuny and Jorion (1995) note that executive departure typically forces early exercise of options.
If the executive leaves the company, whether by choice or by force, she typically has 90 days to exercise her options or else forfeit their entire value. Regardless of the reason for leaving the company, in-themoney options would be exercised early.
Another possible reason for early exercise is to capture dividends that are sufficiently large to justify discarding the option's remaining time value. Although Carpenter and Remmers (2001) find that controlling for exercises that fall between a dividend announcement date and an ex-dividend date leaves their results unchanged, we shall attempt to identify exercises motivated by capture of a dividend in a different manner.
Early exercise could also be attractive because of tax benefits. Goolsbee (2000) shows empirically that the anticipation of a tax increase has apparently led to increased exercise of options. Carpenter and Remmers (2001), and McDonald (2003) demonstrate that there are superior strategies than exercise-and-hold. McDonald notes, however, that exercise in anticipation of a tax increase or moving to a higher tax bracket could be justified. The papers by Cicero (2007) and Cai (2007) consider the possibility that exercises without immediate disposition of the stock might be part of a tax-minimization strategy and could induce manipulation of the exercise date. Following Carpenter and Remmers and given the difficulty of identifying how tax-related considerations could motivate an exercise, we defer this question for future research.
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Before proceeding with our analysis, we should acknowledge that the use of private information, while largely viewed as detrimental to shareholders, is not without some potential benefits. Laux (2007) argues that early exercise on private information can induce executives to abandon poorly performing projects. In light of this and other possible benefits of the use of private information by executives, we limit our study to an examination of the incidence of exercise using private information but not an attempt to take a policy position on whether the social costs outweigh the benefits.
II. Data and Hypothesis Development
In this section we identify the data set and formally develop testable hypotheses. We also describe the methodology we use to test these hypotheses.
A. Data
The primary data set used in this study consists of option exercises by corporate insiders that were obtained from the Certain hypotheses require additional information about the exercises and the executives. For these purposes, we construct a subset of the original data set containing all insider trades in the original data set that can be matched with the necessary insider compensation data reported in Standard and Poor's ExecuComp. These restrictions reduce the total number of exercises to 92,960 and include 9,703 executives from 2,105 firms. We refer to this group as the "merged sample."
B. Hypotheses
The general approach of the tests is to examine the behavior of long-term abnormal returns around the exercise date. If the abnormal returns are significantly negative following exercise, there is support for, though not confirmation of, the use of private information. Tests comparing the differences in abnormal returns between two groups are then used to examine the case for whether the negative abnormal returns reflect the use of private information. In the next sub-section we describe our methodology for measuring abnormal returns. At this juncture, let us assume that abnormal returns can be measured. 4 It is possible that the dividends themselves contain information. A decrease (increase) in the dividend could, for example, signal the expectation of poor (good) firm-specific performance. Exercises that appear to be motivated by dividend capture could contain private information, but consistent with our hypothesis, dividend-motivated exercises should contain less private information than exercises not motivated by dividends. 5 As we will show later, there is another possible explanation of how exercises associated with departure can be motivated by private information.
The ExecuComp data set enables us to obtain a proxy for liquidity using the proportion of options exercised to those vested but not exercised. 6 We also consider that when options are exercised and the stock is not sold, the executive is unlikely to possess negative information. Therefore, we propose this hypothesis: We should note that there may be interactions between the various motivations for exercise that are unrelated to private information. For example, an executive in need of cash but holding an unvested option would surely exercise as soon as it is vested. If the cash is not needed at a specific time, the executive might wait until shortly before the ex-dividend date. These motivations are impossible to disentangle, but they cause no problems because they are consistent with our objective of separating exercises based on private information from those that are not. And if some exercises based on private information are contained in samples of exercises that should not be based on private information, we have merely raised the barrier in detecting the presence of private information.
Each hypothesis is tested by examining abnormal performance following exercise with one-tailed t-tests. A one-tailed test is appropriate because any private information that leads to exercise is likely to be only negative in nature. Optimistic information should not trigger exercise because exercise would result in loss of time value and the benefits of the information would be captured by the option as well as the stock. As noted above, managers are far more inclined to sell stock acquired upon exercise, which is inconsistent with the expectation of positive abnormal performance. We conduct one-tailed tests comparing groups of exercises, such as exercises at expiration and exercises prior to expiration. Onetailed tests are appropriate for these tests as well, because we expect the effect to be one-directional.
C. Methodology
Most studies of abnormal returns employ one of several commonly used techniques for identifying expected returns. The actual returns are then subtracted from the expected returns to obtain the abnormal returns and appropriate statistical tests are applied to determine if the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are significant in the expected direction. Exercises of stock options, however, pose a special difficulty that can induce a subtle bias. The parameters required for estimating expected returns are typically estimated over a period prior to the event that is assumed to be a term of normal (vis-a-vis "abnormal") stock price behavior. But stock option exercises usually occur following a potentially long period of strong positive performance of the stock. Thus, the alphas would be estimated over a period of primarily rising stock prices and would be biased upward, which would bias expected returns upward and would increase the likelihood of finding negative abnormal returns after exercise.
Thus, even if there are truly negative abnormal returns afterwards, we could overstate their magnitude.
Alternatively, there could be no true abnormal performance that is mistakenly turned into apparent negative abnormal performance. Thus, estimation period bias is particularly acute in studies of executive stock option exercises. In addition, this pattern of an event occurring after a period of rising prices can potentially induce a form of pseudo-timing bias, which we discuss later.
To avoid this bias, we follow Barber and Lyon (1997) in adopting an event-time matching-firm portfolio as a benchmark for calculating buy-and-hold abnormal returns for our sample firms. Because there is no parameter estimation, this method eliminates the bias discussed above. Our sample firm is, therefore, benchmarked against a portfolio of comparable firms over the same time period that did not experience exercises.
7
For each event date, we identify five firms matched according to industry, size, and book-tomarket in the following manner. 8 Consider a single exercise event that is a component of a sub-sample. 7 We also conducted most of our tests using market-adjusted and raw returns. Our results were only slightly different and our conclusions are still supported. 8 The choice of number of firms is arbitrary. Barber and Lyon (1977) make no recommendation on the number of firms. Jegadeesh (2000) uses ten firms. We attempted to use ten firms but were unable to obtain a sufficiently high quality match on size and book-to-market for firms without the corresponding type of exercise, probably due to the fact that executive stock option exercises are such a common event. Choosing a small number of firms makes the benchmark relatively undiversified, which will make it more difficult to find consistent results. To this extent, our results are biased against finding abnormal returns.
All exercises in that sub-sample have a common characteristic. Let us assume they are all vest date exercises and the firm is called XYZ. We identify the industry of the firm and select all firms in that industry as potential benchmark firms. We first eliminate XYZ from the benchmark set and then eliminate all other firms from the benchmark set that also have a vest date exercise within one year of the event date. We then eliminate all firms with a market capitalization at the end of the previous year that differs by more than 30% from that of XYZ. We then select the five firms in the benchmark set that are closest to XYZ with respect to the book-to-market value ratio at the end of the previous year. We now have a benchmark portfolio for each unique exercise and can compare the returns following exercise of the options to those of a comparable group.
The tests are conducted using daily returns. We observe performance over three post-event periods: 365 days, 182 days, and 90 calendar days. For a given day, the arithmetic mean daily return of these five matching firms is calculated to obtain the matching portfolio return. Performance is then measured by calculating the difference between the buy-and-hold returns of firms that had options exercised and the corresponding buy-and-hold matching portfolio returns in the following manner:
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where the subscript EX refers to the firm with the option exercise and MP refers to the matching portfolio, t = 1 is the first day following exercise, T is the selected day (365, 182, or 90) after exercise or the delisting day, whichever comes first, R t = return on day t of the firm with the exercised option, and r it = return of matching firm i on day t.
D. How Much Private Information is Required?
An executive with negative private information would not automatically exercise an option.
Exercise involves loss of time value and interest on the exercise price. The information must be of sufficient quality to justify the cost. The tests based on moneyness (H7) somewhat capture this element, but we conduct an additional measure.
One indication of the required information quality is the stock price change that would justify exercise. For example, in our full sample, the median early-exercised option has 5.3 years remaining before expiration and is in-the-money by a factor of 3.2. The median volatility is about 37%. With a moneyness factor of 3.2, let us set the exercise price at $50 and the stock price at $160. Using a risk-free rate of 4%, we find that the Black-Scholes-Merton value of a non-dividend paying option with these characteristics is about $121, and the exercise value is $110. Suppose the executive has private information that indicates the stock is likely to fall over the next year. If the option is exercised and the proceeds invested in risk-free bonds, the executive would have $110e .004(1) = $114.49 in one year. A stock price of $155.52, which is a decline of 2.8%, would bring the option value down to $114.49 in one year.
Thus, if the executive exercised, we might say that the information predicts a stock price decrease of at least 2.8%. Now consider another option on the same stock but not as deep in-the-money. Let the exercise price be $80 for a moneyness factor of 2. Then the call is worth $101.32 and the exercise value is $80. If the executive exercises and invests the proceeds for one year, he will have $80e 0.04(1) = $83.26.
One year later, a stock price of $144.54 will bring the call value down to $83.26. Thus, exercise implies a stock price decrease of 9.7%. Clearly, options that are not as deep in-the-money require a greater stock price decline and, therefore, more private information.
This analysis provides a measure of the information required to justify exercise but is only an approximation. In spite of its widespread use in executive option valuation, the Black-Scholes-Merton model does not provide precise values of the option to the executive because it ignores the illiquidity of these options. Unfortunately, models that capture executive option valuation typically require knowledge of personal information about the executive, such as the degree of risk aversion, the amount of the executive's non-option wealth, the executive's life expectancy, and how that wealth is invested. The number of possible permutations that would have to be tested with a sample as large as ours is astronomical. In addition, when there are dividends on the stock, the option value under any pricing regime can lie below the exercise value. 9 In that case, the forecasted stock price to justify exercise could be above the current stock price. Thus, this approach will not provide an exact estimate of the required stock price change to justify exercise based on private information, but it should be useful in comparing patterns across groups that we would expect to see when the exercises are motivated by private information.
To measure the quality of the required information, we estimate the percentage of times that the ex post stock price decline was greater than the required stock price decline to justify exercise ex ante.
We call this figure the "hit ratio." Of course, an executive could be in possession of high quality private information about the company, but market or industry factors exert effects that could offset the value of any firm-specific private information. Moreover, even private information does not provide a perfect
forecast. Thus, we should not expect a 100% hit ratio. To determine if the hit ratios have any economic content, it will be helpful to have a benchmark for comparison.
Consider a required stock price decline of x% to justify exercise. If an executive has no private information, a reasonable benchmark for the quality of the private information is the probability that the stock would decline at least x% in the absence of private information. Under lognormality, the N(-d 2 )
parameter of the Black-Scholes-Merton model, which is obtained using an estimate of the expected return and volatility, will provide an estimate of the probability that the stock would decline by a sufficient amount to justify exercise in the absence of private information. Because the return on the matched portfolio is otherwise a benchmark for measuring the abnormal return, we take its expected return as an estimate of the expected return of the stock in the absence of private information.
Consider the above example in which the stock must fall 2.8% in one year such that the value of the option equals the future value of the exercise proceeds. If the stock has an expected return of 10%
and volatility of 37%, in the absence of private information the probability of a decrease of at least 2.8%
is about 44%. Thus, the stock should fall below the critical level more than 44% of the time. The option that is not as deep in-the-money has about a 36% chance of falling the necessary 9.7% in the absence of private information. We will judge each option against its own separate benchmark based on the expected return and volatility of the stock and characteristics of the option.
Being based on the Black-Scholes-Merton model, the hit ratios are not completely indicative of how these options would be valued. Therefore, we expect them to be a somewhat weaker basis for drawing conclusions than would the buy-and-hold abnormal returns. We will, nonetheless, use the hit ratios but do so with great care. We could test the significance of the hit ratios for each group relative to their benchmarks but within-group performance is not the basis for rejection of our null hypotheses. We will, therefore, use the benchmark percentages on a more informal basis and more formally test the differences in the hit ratios for one group in comparison to the other. Recall that it is ultimately the group comparisons that determine whether private information is present.
III. Results
This section is divided into seven sub-sections, according to the hypotheses presented above. Table I reports summary statistics for the full and merged samples and the various stratifications described above. These statistics are frequently referenced throughout this section.
We impose one other constraint on the sample. In many cases, there are multiple exercises of the same or different executives of the same firm in a short period of time. Carpenter and Remmers (2001) recognize this problem and its potential for overstating the significance of the results. They use only the first exercise of an executive of a firm in a month. We also impose a similar constraint. Our returns are measured on a daily basis, so we eliminate multiple exercises on the same day by an executive of the same firm. Because each exercise event does not necessarily have the same relationship to the exercise or vest date, however, we make these eliminations separately on each sub-sample. For example, assume there are five exercises for various executives for a firm in a month. Suppose in constructing our overall sample, we select the first exercise and delete the other four. It is possible that the deleted exercises could be liquidity-motivated or departure-motivated. If we deleted them, we would lose these observations from subsequent tests in which they would be most needed. Hence, we construct each sub-sample separately and then choose only the first exercise per company per day.
As noted previously, we do not formally develop hypotheses for the full or merged samples.
These samples are not stratified, and therefore do not reveal whether abnormal returns following exercises that should be motivated by private information are different from those following exercises that should not be motivated by private information. We do, however, examine the overall and merged samples.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) from day -365 to day +365
and Table II shows the statistical results, including calendar time t-tests. As expected, the stock exhibits strong firm-specific performance prior to exercise. For the full sample the results are significantly negative for 182 and 365 days following exercise, suggesting that private information could be a dominating factor. For the merged sample, however, BHARs are positive and significant for 365 and 182 days after exercise so the results do not appear to be dominated by users of private information. One reason for this finding could be that the merged sample, which requires ExecuComp data, will tend to consist of larger firms. Consistent with Carpenter and Remmers, the use of private information could be more prevalent in smaller firms. The benchmark hit ratios vary directly with the holding period and range from 34 to 45%, and the actual hit ratios are much higher at more than 47% in all cases. In fact, for all groups and sub-groups in this study, the hit ratios are significantly higher than the benchmark hit ratios.
Of course, these full and merged sample results are not stratified and merely indicate that exercises motivated by private information could dominate those not motivated by private information for the full sample, and exercises not motivated by private information could dominate those motivated by private information for the merged sample. The more critical tests are those that examine whether exercises that are hypothesized to be motivated by private information are followed by significantly lower abnormal performance than those that are not.
Note in Figures 1 and 2 that we do indeed see the pattern previously noted: prices rise prior to exercise. For the full sample, prices began falling thereafter. For the merged sample, the rate of increase drops off around the exercise date, but the BHAR series continues to increase. Both graphs, however, suggest a pattern of near-perfect timing. This result is likely to be nothing more than pseudo timing as discussed by Schultz (2003) in relation to the performance of IPOs. Pseudo timing arises when an event follows and is often triggered by a period of rising stock prices. Of course, IPOs and stock option exercises would have this characteristic. Pseudo timing can mean that abnormal returns will tend to be negative following the event. Hence, the existence of negative abnormal returns is not by itself proof of the use of private information. Pseudo timing, however, is an absolute but not relative concept. Pseudo timing can appear to explain the near perfect timing of a group of common exercises, but it cannot explain the post-exercise differences across groups distinguished by a factor such as early exercise versus maturity exercise, vest date exercise versus not vest date exercise, and so forth. Thus, separation into groups is critical and is the principal basis for the conclusions we draw.
A. Results According to Early Exercise versus Exercise at Expiration
In this sub-section we report our tests to determine whether there is any difference in abnormal performance according to whether the options are exercised early or at expiration. Relevant summary statistics are presented in Panel A of Table I . About 93% of usable exercises in the full sample occur prior to expiration, an average of 2.87 years after vesting and 5 years before expiration. Statistics for the merged sample are similar to those of the full sample, but the merged sample exercises occur slightly later. Figure 3 shows the BHARs from day -365 to day +365 for both the early and expiration exercises in the full sample and Panel A of Table III provides statistical details. As expected, the BHARs for maturity exercises do not show much of a pattern prior to exercise. These options would, of course, be inthe-money, but their exercise is principally motivated by the expiration itself. Following exercise, their
BHARs rise slightly for a brief period but then fall slowly over a longer period of time. For 90 days, the BHAR is positive but not significant. For 182 and 365 days, the BHARs are negative and significant with t's of -2.95 and -1.92. Of course, we know that pseudo timing could explain this apparent use of private information when it is unlikely to exist. For options exercised prior to expiration, the BHARs are sharply lower following exercise with t's of -4.01, -2.70, and -1.49 for 365, 182, and 90 days respectively. The differences between the BHARs for all three horizons are significant in the expected direction. Thus, options exercised early have negative BHARs that are significantly lower than those of options exercised at expiration. The hit ratios are significantly higher for options exercised early in comparison to options exercised at expiration for the 365-and 182-day holding periods, but the difference is not significant for the 90-day holding period.
Thus, the evidence supports H1, which state that options exercised early appear to be associated with the use of private information. Those exercised at expiration indicate some evidence of private information but are followed by significantly weaker performance than options exercised early.
B. Results According to Vest Date Exercise
We now partition all early exercises according to whether the exercise occurred on the vest date.
As noted earlier, we define a vest date exercise as one in which exercise occurs within 30 days after the vest date. 10 Summary statistics are presented in Panel A of Table I . Of 350,922 early exercises, we find that almost 93% occur after the vest date. Figure 4 shows the BHARs from day -365 to +365 for early exercises on the vest date and those after the vest date. As expected, both series rise sharply prior to expiration and appear to peak around the exercise date. Of course this result is likely to be a sampling phenomenon as previously discussed. But BHARs following vest date exercises are mostly flat, while
BHARs follow exercises not on the vest date continue to fall for 365 days. Thus, evidence from the analysis based on whether the options are exercised on the vest date is consistent with H2. Vest date exercises appear to contain less private information than exercises that occur after the vest date but before expiration.
C. Results According to Dividend-Motivated Exercise
As noted previously, standard option theory demonstrates that one reason any call option holder could choose to exercise early is to capture an upcoming dividend payment. Exercises that are motivated by the capture of dividends should not be based on private information. To remove exercises that are likely to be motivated by dividends, we identify the exercises that occur close but prior to the ex-dividend date. We first capture the ex-dividend dates from CRSP and then merge them with our full sample of exercises. Using only early exercises, each exercise event is assigned a date in weeks relative to the upcoming dividend, in which a week is defined as five business days. We then examine the number of exercises per week and observe a convex pattern in which the number of exercises begins to decrease following the ex-dividend dates, reaches a floor, and then begins increasing with the number sharply increasing in the last few weeks before the ex-dividend date.
The observed pattern of exercises prior to an ex-dividend date suggests that dividend-motivated early exercise could start occurring much earlier than the day before the ex-dividend date. We define a dividend-motivated exercise as one occurring within 15 business days before the ex-dividend date, which we refer to as weeks -1, -2, and -3. Exercises not motivated by dividends are defined as those occurring in weeks -7, -8, -9, and -10 as well as exercises of options on stocks that do not pay dividends. Exercises occurring -4, -5, and -6 weeks relative to the ex-dividend date could contain both dividend-motivated and non-dividend-motivated exercises. Because these exercises cannot be clearly classified either way, we omit this group from consideration in testing this hypothesis. After removing observations with insufficient data, there are 44,951 dividend-motivated exercises and 263,005 not-dividend motivated exercises. Summary statistics are presented in Table I . Figure 5 shows the BHARs from day -365 to +365 for dividend-motivated and non-dividendmotivated early exercises. As expected, both sets of BHARs rise prior to exercise and peak at the exercise date, but there are clear distinctions between the two groups following exercise. days. Tests for the differences are highly significant in the expected direction with t's larger than -6.5 for each period. The differences in the hit ratios are in the expected direction and are significant for all three holding periods. Thus, H3 is strongly supported.
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D. Results According to Executive Departure
In this sub-section we conduct tests to determine whether options exercised when an executive leaves the firm are based on private information. We define a departure exercise as one that occurs within plus or minus 270 days of the executive departure date. For this test, we require the departure date, so we must use the merged sample. This data set contains 82,146 useable early exercises. We find that 5,364
were associated with executive departure. 12 Summary statistics are presented in Panel B of Table I . Figure 6 shows the BHARs from day -365 to +365 for exercises that are induced by departure and those that are not. It seems intuitive that an executive would consider the decision to leave the company as independent of whether he has vested in-the-money options. If the decision to depart were made, the executive would logically exercise all in-the-money options. Such exercises would not likely be motivated by private information. But the pattern in Figure 6 suggests that executives might well be motivated to leave the firm and exercise their options based on private information. The differences are 11 We also considered the possibility that blackout periods, which have been studied by Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) , could interact with dividends. Thus, some apparently dividend-motivated exercises could occur as option holders come out of blackout periods. But if there is any such bias, then exercises motivated by private information will simply be included in the dividend-motivated exercises sample and make it more difficult to find evidence of the use of private information. Thus, any such bias would be conservative and would seem relevant only if we had not found significant differences. In addition, some apparently dividend-motivated exercises could occur prior to periods of poor abnormal performance because the dividend was decreased and provided a negative signal. Because we find no negative abnormal performance in the period following exercises classified as dividend-motivated, it seems likely that any such possibilities are relatively minor and dominated by pure dividend-motivated exercises. 12 Executives are likely to begin liquidating their option portfolios well in advance of their actual departure. They also typically have 90 days after departure to exercise before they must forfeit the options. For these reasons we separate exercises within plus or minus 270 days of the reported departure date. For robustness we also separated exercises within plus or minus 90, 180, 300, 330, and 365 days of departure. Results are consistent with those reported.
striking. As expected, BHARs for both groups rise sharply until exercise. Following exercise, BHARs for exercises not motivated by departure continue to rise while those motivated by departure fall sharply. -3.29, and -3.22 . The differences between the BHARs for these two groups are highly significant for all three holding periods. The difference in the hit ratio for the two groups is not significant for the 365-day period but is significant for the 182-and 90-day periods, with the hit ratio for the departure group being the larger.
Thus, our results are not consistent with H4. Exercises motivated by departure appear to be associated with the use of private information, indeed more so than exercises not motivated by departure.
Given this finding, it is worthwhile to investigate further by identifying the reasons for departure. The BHARs for both groups after exercise behave similarly. Consistent with the results for the departure group as a whole, both of these groups show mostly significant negative performance following exercise.
The differences are not significant for the 365-and 182-day horizons. For the 90-day horizon, however, BHARs for the resignation group are significantly lower than for the retirement group. The hit ratios are higher for the resignation group for the 365-and 182-day holding periods, and the differences are significant. The difference is not significant for the 90-day holding period.
Thus, overall we find that H4 is not supported. Departing executives exercising options do appear to be motivated by private information, with a very slight edge to departures motivated by resignation. Several possible explanations exist. The executive could have foreseen poor firm-specific performance and chose to "cash out" and leave. Alternatively, the board could have anticipated difficult times ahead and felt no confidence in the executive's ability to lead the firm through this period. If that is the case, then the executive's replacement did no better. A third possible explanation is that the firm performed poorly because the executive left. We are unable to distinguish whether there are any differences in the stock's performance according to whether the exercise follows a retirement or a resignation, as neither group can be clearly distinguished from the other after exercise. These findings suggest a need for further research on why firms appear to perform poorly following the departure of an executive who also exercises options.
We should add that it is common for departing executives to receive large severance packages.
Yermack (2006b) estimates that, for CEO's of Fortune 500 companies in virtually the same period studied here, the average package amounts to $5.4 million. The avoidance of future losses by exercising options on private information could be viewed as another element of these "golden handshakes."
E. Results According to Proportion of Vested Stock Exercised
As noted earlier, we are interested in separating exercises that are motivated by private information from those that are motivated by the executive's need for liquidity. If an executive is in possession of private information that suggests poor upcoming firm-specific performance, the executive would probably exercise a large proportion of exercisable options, if not all of them.
The ExecuComp database contains items that enable us to estimate the proportion of options exercised to those vested that remained unexercised. ExecuComp provides the number of unexercised exercisable options (UEO), which is the number of vested but unexercised options outstanding at fiscal year-end. This figure includes both in-and out-of-the-money options, however, so it overstates the number of options that could be exercised but are not. To address this problem, we estimate the proportion of exercised options to vested unexercised options using the exercise value of UEO reported by ExecuComp, which is the exercise value of in-the-money exercisable options. This figure represents the realized value if the executive had exercised all vested options at year-end. 13 Since the exercise value of out-of-the-money options is zero, only the exercise value of in-the-money options is reported. Thus, our ratio is the value of options exercised to the exercise value of unexercised vested options at year-end and proxies for the number of options exercised relative to the number of vested options not exercised.
14 The merged sample of 82,146 early exercises includes 1,472 that do not report UEO and therefore are eliminated. The remaining 80,674 transactions are ranked by the proportion of options exercised relative to those vested but unexercised and placed into two groups. One group contains exercises in which the value of options exercised exceeds the value of vested options not exercised. Thus, the ratio of these exercised to unexercised options is more than 100%. The other group contains the complement, in 13 One potential problem is the fact that the options are exercised during the year and must be matched up with figures for holdings at fiscal year-end. Our concern, however, is with relative performance across groups. There does not appear to be any reason why this factor would make one group perform differently from another. 14 One could make a compelling case that it is indeed the exercise value of the options, not the number of options, that is important. An executive in possession of private information who holds deep in-the-money options would be more inclined to exercise most of those options than if he holds an equivalent number of only slightly in-the-money options, the exercise of which would also discard more time value.
which the ratio is less than 100%. The groups are almost equally sized with 23,815 in the first group and 23,173 in the second, the small difference occurring because we divide the sample before selecting the first exercise per executive per day and building the benchmark portfolio. Summary statistics for this sample partition are presented in Panel B of Table I . For ease of discussion, we will refer to these two groups as "large exercises" and "small exercises." Figure 8 shows the BHARs from day -365 to + 365 for both groups, and Table VI, Panel A shows the statistics. As expected, both groups show sharply rising performance prior to expiration and peak at the exercise date. The large exercises group shows falling performance following exercise, while the small exercises group shows performance that continues to rise. For the large exercises group, BHARs are negative for all three periods, but only the 365-day BHAR is significant. For the small exercise group, BHARs are positive and highly significant for each time period. The differences between the groups, however, are highly significant for all periods, and the hit ratios are significantly higher for the large exercises group for all three holding periods.
Thus, this evidence is consistent with H5 in that exercises in which the number of options exercised is large relative to those not exercised contain private information. While the negative BHARs are significant for the large exercises group only over the longest holding period, the differences between the large exercises group and the small exercises group are highly significant in the expected direction for all three periods.
F. Results According to the Proportion of Stock Sold
In this sub-section we conduct tests based on the proportion of stock sold that is acquired upon exercise. Due to data limitations, however, one cannot directly observe whether acquired stock is sold.
We can, however, use a procedure similar to that of Ofek and Yermack (2000) to estimate this variable.
They propose that if executives retain shares acquired from option exercise and restricted stock grants, then stock ownership should rise one-for-one during years in which executives receive restricted stock or exercise options. Thus, by comparing the change in ownership with the amount of options exercised and restricted stock granted, we obtain a proxy for the stock acquired that was sold.
As noted earlier, the merged sample has a median percentage of stock sold of about 98%, but the distribution is highly skewed with a mean of about 78%. We partition the sample of early exercises into two sub-samples: those that involve the sale of greater than 50% of the stock acquired and those that involve the sale of less than 50% of the stock acquired. Summary statistics are presented in Panel B of Table I . The group selling more than 50% consists of 64,608 exercises and has a mean percentage sold of 92.9% and a median of 99.9%. The group selling less than 50% consists of 13,071 exercises with a mean percentage sold of 13.1% and a median of 0.00%. For ease of exposition we will refer to these two groups as "large stock sales" and "small stock sales." Figure 9 shows the BHARs from day -365 to day +365 for the large stock sales and small stock sales groups. As expected, BHARs of both groups peak at the exercise day, but the small stock sales group continues to rise, while the large stock sales group is mostly flat thereafter. Table VI, Panel B reports the statistics. The large stock sales mean BHARs are positive for 365 and 182 days and marginally significant for 182 days but negative and not significant for 90 days. For the small stock sales group, BHARs are positive and highly significant for all three horizons. Because the small stock sales group does indeed hold on to more stock than it sells, it should not be surprising that we find better stock performance somewhat indicative of private information. 15 T-tests for differences between the three groups are highly significant in the expected direction. The hit ratios, however, are surprisingly higher for the small stock sales group for all three holding periods and the differences are significant.
These findings are somewhat but not completely supportive of H6. Exercises that involve the sale of a large percentage of acquired stock do not show negative performance after exercise but do appear to be followed by significantly weaker performance than exercises that involve the sale of a small percentage of acquired stock. Exercises that involve the sale of a small percentage of acquired stock are followed by strong positive performance, so they are probably for purposes other than private information. 16 Hit ratio tests are inconclusive. Overall, we find that percentage of stock sold is not a strong variable in discriminating exercises based on private information from those not based on private information. This result could be due to the use of the Ofek-Yermack estimator, which is only an approximation of a very difficult variable to measure.
G. Moneyness Tests
We now examine whether exercises of options contain more private information based on the option's moneyness. Recall that for in-the-money options, time value is inversely related to moneyness.
Hence, options with low moneyness are more costly to exercise than options with high moneyness and would require more private information to justify exercise. After selecting only the first exercise per executive per month, we divide the 145,252 usable early exercises into five moneyness quintiles. Q1 is the group closest to at-the-money, and Q5 is the group deepest in-the-money. Other descriptive statistics are contained in Table I . Figure 10 shows the BHARs for the five moneyness quintiles. Note the consistency of the results, as no lines intersect. Options that are deepest in-the-money (Q5) naturally exhibit the strongest pre-exercise performance, and pre-exercise performance is monotonically lower with each group that is less in-the-money. The closest to at-the-money group (Q1) shows the poorest performance after exercise and each group with more moneyness shows successively better performance. Q5, the deepest in-the-money, shows strong positive performance after exercise. Table VII provides the statistics. We see that Q1, Q2, and Q3 show significant negative performance following exercise for all holding periods. Q4 shows significant negative performance for the 365-day holding period and negative but insignificant performance for the 182-and 90-day holding periods. Q5, the deepest in-the-money, shows positive and significant performance for all holding periods. A t-test for the difference between BHARs for Q1 and Q5 is highly significant for all three holding periods.
A comparison of Q1 to Q5 reveals that their hit ratios are significantly different. Ignoring abnormal returns and focusing only on the hit ratios, one would arrive at a different conclusion when comparing sub-samples. For example, we hypothesize and confirm in the abnormal returns that Q1 exercises would likely have the most private information and Q5 the least. But the hit ratios show that Q5 exercises were followed by price decreases that exceeded the minimum more than 65% of the time over 365 days while Q1 exercises were followed by price decreases that exceeded the minimum only about 36% of the time. The explanation for this result lies in the fact that moneyness and time value are inversely related. The Q1 group has the most time value, and the Q5 group has the least. Therefore, ranking by moneyness results in an inverse ranking by time value. Thus, both a moneyness sub-grouping and the hit ratio tests are attempting to capture the same effect and doing it in a somewhat opposite manner. The deepest in-the-money group has the least time value to overcome and, therefore, is far more successful in overcoming its time value lost. The least in-the-money group has the most time value to overcome and, therefore, is far less successful in overcoming its time value lost.
In conclusion, the moneyness tests support H7 and provide a perspective on the amount of private information used when exercising early. Options only slightly in-the-money are the most costly to exercise, while options deep in-the-money are the least costly. Hence, we should observe considerably poorer firm-specific performance following exercise when the cost of exercising in terms of time value lost is higher. That is indeed what occurs and the results are consistent across moneyness classes.
IV. Further Tests
In this section we report the results of some additional tests. Although we did not previously present formal hypotheses for these tests,, they are suggested by some of the results reported in the previous section and provide diagnostic checks, further scrutiny, and possible explanations for some of the results. These tests are conducted for the 365-day periods.
A. The Impact of SOX
The performance is observed for both time periods. The 365-day BHAR is -2.44% (t = -1.02) before SOX and -2.92% (t = -6.87) after SOX. The differences between the BHARs are not significant. Thus, SOX apparently had no effect on exercise based on private information.
As noted earlier, SOX also accelerated the filing deadline. This rule, however, permits a number of exceptions such that late filings are quite possible. We examined late filings in the post-SOX period to determine if executives achieved even greater gains when filing late. In the post-SOX period, we obtain a sample of 6,105 late filings and 70,220 filed on time. The twelve-month BHAR for late filings is -2.99 (t = -2.61) and for on-time filings is -2.97 (t = -6.98), both of which are significant. The differences, however, are not significant. Thus, late filings do not appear to be more informative.
B. Trends Across Time
To determine the consistency of these results across time, we repeat our full sample tests for each year over the 1996-2005 period. Naturally the results vary somewhat from year to year. The 365-day BHAR is negative in eight of 10 years and significant in five of those eight years. The 365-day BHAR is positive in two years and significant in one year. The patterns, however, suggest no trend over time.
C. Reloads
Reload options are those in which the employee exercises the option by tendering stock and upon exercise receives options to replace shares tendered. Because exercise of reload options still leaves the employee holding options, there is the possibility that reload options could be more commonly exercised without any private information. Indeed Dybvig and Loewenstein (2003) show that an optimal strategy is to exercise a reload option any time it is in-the-money. We isolate the reload options in the merged sample and find only 448, or 1.2%, out the sample of 36,936 are reloads. Both groups show positive returns after exercise and the no-reload group is slightly significant, but the differences are not significant.
D. Executive Rank
An interesting question is whether the evidence of exploitation of private information is stronger the higher the executive rank. TFI provides four codes that identify the executive's rank. 17 We examine the full sample to determine if there are any differences in the use of private information across these ranks. The number of exercises in each group is 42,388 for Rank 1, 109,301 for Rank 2, 6,715 for Rank 3, and 2,821 for Rank 4. The BHARs are negative and significant for Ranks 1 and 2 with t's of -2.31 and -5.55. For Rank 3 the BHAR is positive but not significant, while for Rank 4 the BHAR is negative and not significant. The differences between Ranks 1 and 2 combined versus 3 and 4 combined is significant, confirming that the higher ranked executives do appear to make greater use of private information.
Interestingly, however, the best performance is achieved by Rank 2 and not Rank 1, and the difference between Rank 2 and Rank 1 is significant. Thus, Rank 2 executives appear to make greater use of private information. This result could be due to the fact that top level executives are more scrutinized and might be more careful in using private information.
E. Most Informed and Least Informed
Thus far we have examined the data one dimension at a time, such as exercise date, vest date exercise, dividend-motivated exercise, moneyness, etc. We now combine events that should represent the most informed exercises into a single group, leave all other exercises in a separate group, and compare the groups. The most informed group consists of 40,791 exercises not at expiration, not at the vest date, not motivated by dividends, and in moneyness quintiles 1 and 2. The complementary group has 147, 321
exercises. The BHAR is -7.78 for the most informed group and -1.66 for the least informed, both of which are significant. As expected, the difference is highly significant with a t-statistic of -17.32.
F Implications of Different Sample Sizes
We also observe one more interesting result. For each group comparison that was not constructed by dividing the sample in half or into quintiles, we had notably different sample sizes for the two groups.
For every expiration exercise, there are 13 early exercises. For every vest date exercise, there are about 13 exercises not on the vest date. For every dividend-motivated exercise, we have six non dividendmotivated exercises. For every exercise in which less than 50% of stock is sold, we have five exercises in which more than 50% of stock is sold. In each case, we find significantly lower abnormal returns for the larger sample. The only exception was the retired-resigned sample in which the differences were not significant. The combination of lower abnormal returns and considerably larger sample sizes in almost every case suggests that the use of private information may well be extremely common.
V. Conclusions
In this study we examine whether early exercises of executive stock options that could be motivated by private information are followed by significantly lower buy-and-hold abnormal returns than are those that are motivated for other reasons. Our results confirm that private information appears to be widely used by executives. It would be desirable if one could measure the percentage of exercises that are motivated by private information. We do find that about 93% of all exercises occur early, a similar but slightly higher percentage do not occur on the vest date, and about 64% are not motivated by the capture of dividends, as they occur soon after the ex-dividend dates. Because many of these motivations can interact, however, it is not possible to identify how many exercises are strictly motivated by private information and how many strictly are not. But we do find distinctly lower buy-and-hold abnormal returns following exercise for samples that should be motivated by private information in comparison to samples that should not. In the absence of private information, there appears to be no other logical explanation.
Of course, these findings do not prove that executives are engaged in behavior that would meet the legal definition of insider trading. All executives form opinions about the future performance of the stock and their ability to manage the firm successfully. Illegal inside information is but one of many forms of private and potentially quite accurate information about future company performance. These exercises and the subsequent stock sales are filed with the SEC, so executives and the SEC must generally believe the transactions pass the test of legality. As noted earlier, exercising on inside information might even have some benefits in reducing agency costs. In any case, documenting the use of inside information is an important step toward understanding the costs and benefits. . Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for exercises motivated by dividends and exercises not motivated by dividends. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for each firm are estimated using a benchmark portfolio constructed by matching on industry, size, book-to-market and with no corresponding exercise event during the relevant time period. This sample includes only options exercised more than 30 days before expiration. A dividend-motivated exercise is defined as an option exercised early in which the reported exercise date occurs within 15 trading days prior to the ex-dividend date reported in CRSP. Notdividend-motivated exercises include exercises that occur from seven to ten weeks prior to an ex-dividend dates and exercises of non-dividend paying firms. These results apply to the full sample, which is comprised of option exercises reported by corporate insiders to the SEC between 1996 and 2005 and compiled by Thomson Financial Insider filings. 
BHAR (%)
Exercises not motivated by departure
Exercises motivated by departure Exercises motivated by departure Figure 6 . Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for exercises motivated by executive departure and those not motivated by executive departure. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for each firm are estimated using a benchmark portfolio constructed by matching on industry, size, book-to-market and with no corresponding exercise event during the relevant time period. This sample includes only options exercised more than 30 days before expiration. Exercises motivated by executive departure are defined as those that occurred within plus or minus 270 days of the executive leaving the company. Exercises not motivated by executive departure include all other exercises that occur at least 30 days before expiration. These results apply to the merged sample, which is comprised of insider trades reported in the Table II  File . Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for exercises in which the executive resigned and exercises in which the executive retired. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for each firm are estimated using a benchmark portfolio constructed by matching on industry, size, book-to-market and with no corresponding exercise event during the relevant time period. This sample includes only options exercised more than 30 days before expiration. These results apply to the merged sample, which is comprised of insider trades reported in the Table II File 
Exercises with more than 100% of options exercised
Exercises with less than 100% of options exercised Figure 8 . Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for options grouped according to the ratio of exercised options to vested but unexercised options. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for each firm are estimated using a benchmark portfolio constructed by matching on industry, size, book-to-market and with no corresponding exercise event during the relevant time period. This sample includes only options exercised more than 30 days before expiration. A proxy is used to estimate the ratio of exercised to unexercised vested options, which is based on the exercise value of exercised options to the exercise value of unexercised vested options. As described in Table I , the group labeled > 100% is the group in which the ratio of the value of exercised options to vested but unexercised options is more than 100%, and the group labeled < 100% is the complementary group. These results apply to the merged sample, which is comprised of insider trades reported in the Table II File 
Exercises with more than 50% of acquired stock sold
Exercises with less than 50% of acquired stock sold Figure 9 . Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for exercises in which more than 50% of the stock acquired upon exercise is sold and exercises in which less than 50% of the stock acquired up on exercise is sold. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for each firm are estimated using a benchmark portfolio constructed by matching on industry, size, book-to-market and with no corresponding exercise event during the relevant time period. This sample includes only options exercised more than 30 days before expiration. These results apply to the merged sample, which is comprised of insider trades reported in the Table II File Moneyness is defined as the ratio of the stock price to the exercise price. Q1 is the quintile containing options that are closest to at-the-money, and Q5 is the quintile containing options deepest in-the-money. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for each firm are estimated using a benchmark portfolio constructed by matching on industry, size, book-to-market and with no corresponding exercise event during the relevant time period. This sample includes only options exercised more than 30 days before expiration. These results apply to the merged sample, which is comprised of insider trades reported in the Table II File 
Table I Descriptive Statistics of the Exercise Data
Panel A reports statistics for the full sample, which includes option exercises by corporate insiders reported to the SEC between 1996 and 2005 available on Thomson Financial Insider filings. The full sample is partitioned according to whether the exercise occurred early or at expiration, whether the exercise occurred on the vest date, and whether the exercise was motivation by capture of a dividend. Early exercise is defined as exercise with more than 30 days to expiration. Of the 411,366 exercises in the full sample, 33,945 do not report an exercise date. Exercise on the vest date is defined as an exercise between zero and 30 days after the vest date. "Not on vest date" exercise includes all other early exercises. "Dividend-motivated" exercise includes all options exercised within 15 business days prior to the ex-dividend date. "Not dividend-motivated" exercise represents exercises seven to ten weeks before the dividend or all exercises of firms that do not pay dividends. Panel B reports all statistics for the merged sample, which is comprised of insider trades reported in the Table II File of TFI for the period 1996 through 2005 in which the transactions can be matched with the insider's data in Standard and Poor's ExecuComp. The merged sample is partitioned similarly to the full sample, and also according to whether the exercise was induced by executive departure from the firm, the proportion of options exercised to those vested that were not exercised, and the proportion of stock sold at exercise. Of the 92,960 exercises in the merged sample 6,043 do not report an exercise date. Exercises associated with executive departure are those early exercises in which the executive left the company within 270 days of the exercise. Resigned exercises are those in which the reason for departure was resignation, and retired exercises are those in which the reason was retirement. Of the 5,364 departure exercises, 824 do not indicate a reason for departure. Early exercises in the merged sample are ranked by the proportion of options exercised relative to those vested but unexercised and placed into two groups. "> 100%" contains exercises in which the value of options exercised to the value of vested but unexercised options is more than 100% and "< 100%" is the complement. Of the 82,146 early exercises in the merged sample, 1,472 do not report an unexercised exercisable variable. The group labeled "> 50%" are those in which the executive sold more than 50% of the shares acquired from exercise, and the "< 50%" group are the remaining exercises. Of the 82,146 early exercises in the merged sample, 4,467 do not report shares held at fiscal year end. Q1-Q5 moneyness refers to quintiles based on the moneyness of the options at exercise with Q1 being closest to a-the-money and Q5 being deepest in-the-money.
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Full Sample Option Exercises
Number of exercises The sample is drawn from the full sample described in Table I by selecting only the first exercise for a firm in a given day. The benchmark is the portfolio of five firms matched on industry, size, and book-tomarket with no corresponding exercise event in the test period. Calendar-time t-statistics are presented. The hit ratios are the percentage of times the stock price fell more than implied by the Black-ScholesMerton model to justify exercise. The percentage in parenthesis beside the hit ratio is the mean probability of a stock price decrease of at least the required amount to justify exercise under the assumption of no private information. The sample sizes for the 365-day period are 178,017 for the abnormal returns and 145,347 for the hit ratios. The sample sizes for the 182-and 90-day periods are identical to or extremely close to the numbers reported here.
Mean The sample is drawn from the full sample of exercises described in Table I by selecting only the first exercise for a firm in a given day. The benchmark is the portfolio of five firms matched on industry, size, and book-to-market with no corresponding exercise event in the test period. Calendar-time t-statistics are presented. The hit ratios are the percentage of times the stock price fell more than implied by the Black-Scholes-Merton model to justify exercise. The percentage in parenthesis beside the hit ratio is the mean probability of a stock price decrease of at least the required amount to justify exercise under the assumption of no private information. An early exercise is defined as an exercise with more than 30 days remaining to expiration. A vest date exercise is an exercise defined as occurring between 0 and 30 days after the vest date. The sample sizes for the 365-day period are 149,286 early exercises, 15,400 maturity exercises, 10,339 vest date exercises, and 143,212 not vest date exercises for the abnormal returns and 126,396 early exercises, 9,022 maturity exercises, 7,752 vest date exercises, and 118,644 not vest date exercises for the hit ratios. The sample sizes for the 182-and 90-day periods are identical to or extremely close to the numbers reported here. The sample is drawn from the full sample described in Table I by selecting only the first exercise for a firm in a given day. A dividendmotivated exercise is defined as an early exercise in which the reported exercise date occurs within 15 trading days prior to the exdividend date. Non-dividend motivated exercises also include exercises of firms that do not pay dividends. The benchmark is the portfolio of five firms matched on industry, size, and book-to-market with no corresponding exercise event in the test period. Calendartime t-statistics are presented. The hit ratios are the percentage of times the stock price fell more than implied by the Black-ScholesMerton model to justify exercise. The percentage in parenthesis beside the hit ratio is the mean probability of a stock price decrease of at least the required amount to justify exercise under the assumption of no private information. The sample sizes for the 365-day period are 114,224 not dividend-motivated exercises and 17,622 dividend-motivated exercises for the abnormal returns and 97,555 not dividendmotivated and 12,492 dividend-motivated exercises for the hit ratios. The sample sizes for the 182-and 90-day periods are identical to or extremely close to the numbers reported here.
Not dividend-motivated exercise The sample is drawn from the merged sample described in Table I by selecting only the first exercise for a firm in a given day. The benchmark is the portfolio of five firms matched on industry, size, and book-to-market with no corresponding exercise event in the test period. Calendar-time t-statistics are presented. The hit ratios are the percentage of times the stock price fell more than implied by the Black-Scholes-Merton model to justify exercise. The percentage in parenthesis beside the hit ratio is the mean probability of a stock price decrease of at least the required amount to justify exercise under the assumption of no private information. Exercises associated with executive departure are those that occur within plus or minus 270 days of the executive leaving the company. The sample sizes for the 365-day period are 34,885 not departure exercises, 2,394 departure exercises, 977 retirement exercises, and 950 resignation exercises for the abnormal returns and 30,285 not departure, 2,142 departure exercises, 1,074 retirement exercises, and 788 resignation exercises for the hit ratios. The sample sizes for the 182-and 90-day periods are identical to or extremely close to the numbers reported here. The sample is drawn from the merged sample described in Table I by selecting only the first exercise for a firm in a given day. The benchmark is the portfolio of five firms matched on industry, size, and book-to-market with no corresponding exercise event in the test period. Calendar-time t-statistics are presented. The hit ratios are the percentage of times the stock price fell more than implied by the Black-Scholes-Merton model to justify exercise. The percentage in parenthesis beside the hit ratio is the mean probability of a stock price decrease of at least the required amount to justify exercise under the assumption of no private information. These results apply to the merged sample, which is comprised of insider trades reported in the Quintile 1 is the 20% of exercises that are closest to at-the-money and Quintile 5 is the 20% of exercises that are deepest in-the-money. The sample is drawn from the full sample described in Table I by selecting only the first exercise for a firm in a given day. The benchmark is the portfolio of five firms matched on industry, size, and book-to-market with no corresponding exercise event in the test period. Calendar-time t-statistics are presented. The hit ratios are the percentage of times the stock price fell more than implied by the Black-Scholes-Merton model to justify exercise. The percentage in parenthesis beside the hit ratio is the mean probability of a stock price decrease of at least the required amount to justify exercise under the assumption of no private information. The sample sizes for the 365-day period are 29,032 for Q1, 29,174 for Q2, 29,177 for Q3, 28,984 for Q4, and 28,885 for Q5 for the abnormal returns and 25,222 for Q1, 25,221 for Q2, 25,221 for Q3, 25,222 for Q4, and 25,221 for Q5 for the hit ratios. The sample sizes for the 182-and 90-day periods are identical to or extremely close to the numbers reported here. 
Q1
